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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 
AND THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM* 
Robert C Post ** 
Always given to a stately form of self-deprecation, William 
Howard Taft would no doubt have been amused by the subject of 
this paper. For of all the Supreme Court Justices of his time, Taft 
was undoubtedly the most averse, for reasons of both affinity and 
conviction, to what modem Americans would recognize as the ideal 
of federalism. 
To appreciate exactly why this is so, however, will require us to 
disentangle at least four separate aspects of that ideal: federalism as 
a commitment to limited national legislative power; federalism as a 
commitment to the diversity of local cultures; federalism as a com-
mitment to decentralized management; and federalism as a commit-
ment to the diffusion of power. Although these four aspects of 
federalism are ordinarily fused together into a single generalized 
preference for state decisionmaking, they in fact rest on distinct ra-
tionales and lead to quite diverse jurisprudential outcomes. These 
differences can be made clear by an examination of Taft's unique 
judicial perspective, an examination that has some relevance to our 
own contemporary struggles with the constitutional implications of 
federalism. 
I 
Taft presided over a Court that, as Felix Frankfurter noted in 
1930, the year of Taft's death, 
invalidated more legislation than in fifty years preceding. Views 
that were antiquated twenty-five years ago have been resurrected 
in decisions nullifying minimum wage laws for women in indus-
try, a standard-weight bread law to protect buyers from short 
weights and honest bakers from unfair competition, a law fixing 
resale price of theatre tickets by ticket scalpers in New York, 
laws controlling exploitation of the unemployed by employment 
• This paper was originally delivered in April of 1990 at the Fourth Berkeley Seminar 
on Federalism. It will also be published in the proceedings of that Seminar. 
•• Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
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agencies and many tax laws.t 
The controversial and reactionary quality of the Taft Court has 
indelibly stamped on the popular as well as the academic mind an 
image of Taft as "a rock-ribbed conservative" in "matters judicial 
and constitutional."2 Taft's close association with conservative Jus-
tices like Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, and McReynolds-Jus-
tices who were later to attempt to undermine the New Deal-has 
been fixed by passages in his letters, written only months before his 
resignation and death, hoping for the "continued life of enough of 
the present membership ... to prevent disastrous reversals of our 
present attitudes."J "With Van and Mac and Sutherland and you 
and Sanford," Taft wrote to Butler on September 14, 1929, "there 
will be five to steady the boat, and ... there would be a good deal of 
difficulty in working through reversals of present positions, even if I 
either had to retire or were gathered to my fathers, so that we must 
not give up at once."4 
Given sentiments like these, the identification of Taft with Van 
Devanter, Sutherland, Butler and McReynolds is readily under-
standable. But the limitations of this identification are readily ap-
parent once Taft's constitutional perspective is scrutinized from the 
vantage of federalism. 
Consider, for example, a decision like Lambert v. Yellowley,s 
which concerned the constitutionality of provisions of the National 
Prohibition Act of 1919 forbidding physicians from prescribing 
"more than a pint of spirituous liquor ... for use by the same per-
son within any period of ten days," and forbidding any such pre-
scription from being "filled more than once."6 Dr. Samuel W. 
Lambert, "a distinguished" doctor, had sought and received an in-
junction against the application of the statute, claiming that it vio-
lated "his constitutional rights as a physician" to "advise the use of 
such medicines and medical treatment as in his opinion are best 
calculated to effect [the] cure and establish [the] health" of his pa-
tients.? In essence Lambert claimed that although the eighteenth 
amendment gave to Congress the power to prohibit the "manufac-
I. Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution, 32 
Current History 235, 239 (1930). 
2. Walter F. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme Court 
Appointments, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159, 161. 
3. William Howard Taft to Pierce Butler, Sept. 14, 1929, quoted in Alpheus Thomas 
Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 294 (Simon & Schuster, 1965). 
4. I d. at 296-97. 
5. 272 u.s. 581 (1926). 
6. I d. at 587. 
7. Id. at 588. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had dismissed the 
injunction. 
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ture, sale, or transportation" of spirituous liquor "for beverage pur-
poses,"s it did not give to Congress the power to regulate the 
medical use of liquor, and all such "control [of] the medical practice 
in the states is beyond the power of the Federal Government."9 
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brandeis and 
heavily edited by Taft, rejected Lambert's claim in a manner that 
strongly upheld the prerogatives of congressional power. 10 
High medical authority being in conflict as to the medicinal value 
of spirituous and vinous liquors taken as a beverage, it would, 
indeed, be strange if Congress lacked the power to determine that 
the necessities of the liquor problem require a limitation of per-
missible prescriptions, as by keeping the quantity that may be 
prescribed within limits which will minimize the temptation to 
resort to prescriptions as pretexts for obtaining liquor for bever-
age uses.II 
Brandeis's opinion was joined by Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter and 
Sanford. 
Justice Sutherland, hammering away at traditional federalist 
themes of limited national power, authored a strong dissent, which 
was joined by Justices McReynolds, Butler and Stone: 
The general design of the Federal Constitution is to give to 
the federal government control over national and international 
matters, leaving to the several states the control of local affairs. 
Prior to the adoption of the 18th Amendment, accordingly, the 
direct control of the manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating 
liquors for all purposes was exclusively under the police powers 
of the states; and there it still remains, save in so far as it has 
been taken away by the words of the Amendment. These words 
are perfectly plain and cannot be extended beyond their import 
without violating the fundamental rule that the government of 
the United States is one of delegated powers only and that "the 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states re-
spectively, or to the people." ... Plainly, Congress in submitting 
the Amendment, and the several states in ratifying it, meant to 
leave the question of the prohibition of intoxicating liquors for 
other than beverage purposes to the determination of the states, 
8. Section 2 of the eighteenth amendment gave to Congress the power to enforce the 
provisions of Section I, which prohibited the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxi-
cating liquors within ... the United States ... for beverage purposes." U.S. Const., Amend. 
XVIII, sec. I. 
9. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 596. 
10. The Brandeis papers suggest that Taft offered Brandeis extensive comments about 
the opinion, and may have actually drafted large portions of it. 
II. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 597. 
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where it had always been.I2 
Relying heavily on Hammer v. Dagenhart,!3 Sutherland argued that 
Brandeis's reasoning could easily transform "a carefully and defi-
nitely limited power" into "a general and unlimited power," and 
thus radically undermine the important "constitutional limitations" 
expressed by the tenth amendment.I4 "The effect of upholding the 
legislation is to deprive the states of the exclusive power, which the 
Eighteenth Amendment has not destroyed, of controlling medical 
practice and transfer it in part to Congress."Is 
Lambert, then, occasioned a classic confrontation between 
those who believed that national legislative power ought to be nar-
rowly circumscribed in deference to the maintenance of decentral-
ized state authority, and those who believed that national legislative 
power ought to be generously endowed with ample means for the 
attainment of its ends. It is entirely characteristic that Taft would 
be on one side of that debate, while the Justices with whom he is 
normally associated-Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds-should be 
on the other.16 On the question of national power, historically a 
central aspect of the debate over federalism, Taft parted company 
with his conservative colleagues. 
In this Taft viewed himself as fulfilling the constitutional pro-
gram of his idol John Marshall, "the greatest Judge that America or 
the World has produced."I7 As Taft repeatedly told the story, Mar-
shall had definitively set the course of the Court toward a "liberal 
construction of the Constitution in conferring powers upon the Na-
tional Government," against "the school of Jefferson" that would 
have "emphasize[d] unduly the sovereignty of the States."1s Like 
Marshall, Taft interpreted the Constitution so as to give the na-
tional government generous powers to accomplish the tasks en-
trusted to it. We know, for example, that Taft thought national 
prohibition foolish and unwise.I9 He favored a "local option ar-
12. ld. 
13. 247 u.s. 251 (1918). 
14. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 604. 
15. ld. 
16. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
17. William Howard Taft, Popular Government: Its Essence, Its Permanence and Its 
Perils 131 (Yale U. Press, 1913) ("Popular Government"). 
18. ld. at 13!-37. William Howard Taft, Address Before the National Civic Federation 
at the Belasco Theatre, Washington D.C. January 17. 1910, in I Presidential Addresses and 
State Papers 549 (Doubleday, 1910) ("Presidential Addresses"); William Howard Taft, Criti-
cisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Am. L. Rev. 641, 645-46 (1895). 
19. "Taft Denounces Dry Amendment," New Haven Journal-Courier, (Saturday, Sept. 
7, 1918), reprinted in The 1918 Year Book of the United States Brewers' Association 21,21-27 
(New York, 1919); Henry F. Pringle, I The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 375 
(Farrar & Rinehart, 1939). Compare id., vol. 2, at 981-83. 
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rangement," because he believed that 
Experience has shown that a law of this kind, sumptuary in its 
character, can only be properly enforced in districts in which a 
majority of the people favor the law, and, therefore, favor its en-
forcement; but in a district where the majority of the people are 
opposed to the law, and do not sympathize with its provisions, a 
sumptuary law is almost certain to become a dead letter. Now 
every one must recognize the demoralizing effect of the enact-
ment of laws and their attempted enforcement and their failure 
because of the lack of public opinion to support the officers of the 
law in attempting such enforcement.2o 
203 
But once the eighteenth amendment authorized federal prohibition 
of liquor, Taft refused to circumscribe national power by any linger-
ing reservations concerning local control. 
It has been remarked, in fact, that Taft's liberal interpretations 
of federal power, particularly with respect to congressional author-
ity under the commerce clause, mark "his most successful and influ-
ential work as Chief Justice."21 Taft moved decisively in this 
direction during his first Term. In Railroad Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy RR. Co. 22 he wrote an opinion 
upholding provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920 authorizing 
the ICC "to fix rates and to take other important steps to maintain 
an adequate railway service for the people of the United States."23 
Although the Act gave the ICC effective jurisdiction over intrastate 
railway rates, Taft did not blink: 
Commerce is a unit and does not regard state lines, and while, 
under the Constitution, interstate and intrastate commerce are 
ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet 
when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, 
the Nation, cannot exercise complete effective control over inter-
state commerce without incidental regulation of intrastate com-
merce, such incidental regulation is not an invasion of state 
authority or a violation of the proviso.24 
Two months later Taft issued another ringing endorsement of 
federal power in Stafford v. Wal/ace,2s a decision from which Jus-
tice McReynolds dissented. In Stafford the Court upheld the Pack-
20. Taft, Popular Government at 46-47 (cited in note 17). See William Howard Taft, 
Four Aspects of Civil Duty 46-47 (Yale U. Press, 1906). 
21. Stanley I. Kutler, Chief Justice Taft, National Regulation. and the Commerce 
Power, 51 J. Am. Hist. 651 (I 965). 
22. 257 U.S. 563 (1922). 
23. !d. at 585. 
24. !d. at 588. 
25. 258 U.S. 495 ( 1922). 
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ers and Stockyards Act of 1921, which sought to impose upon 
stockyards a scheme of federal regulation. Taft wrote that 
[w]hatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threat-
ens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate 
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the 
commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider 
and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will 
certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such 
a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce 
and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.26 
In defining congressional power under the interstate commerce 
clause, Taft drew heavily, as he readily admitted, upon Swift & Co. 
v. United States,21 a 1905 Holmes opinion allowing a bill in equity 
to proceed under the Sherman Act against the same packing firms 
as those regulated by the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. But 
Taft also traveled significantly beyond Swift. The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act had delegated to courts the task of delimiting the bound-
aries of federal power; the Packers and Stockyards Act represented 
a congressional judgment about the reach of Congress's own au-
thority. Taft, in a move that was to become the foundation of mod-
ern doctrine, held that the Court was to defer to such congressional 
judgments unless their basis was "nonexistent." 
In 1923 Taft authored another major opinion sustaining con-
gressional power under the commerce clause. Over the dissenting 
votes of McReynolds and Sutherland, Taft in Board of Trade of the 
City of Chicago v. Olsen 2s upheld the Grain Futures Act of 1922, 
writing that the commerce clause was to be interpreted according 
"to the real and practical essence of modern business growth. "29 
The nub of the opinion lay in Taft's explicit deference to the judg-
ment of Congress that transactions involving grain futures were 
"susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control which are 
detrimental to the producer and consumer and persons handling 
grain in interstate commerce."3o 
Olsen is particularly significant because less than a year before, 
in Hill v. Wallace,31 Taft had written for the Court to strike down 
the Future Trading Act of 1921, on the ground that it had at-
tempted to use the taxing power to regulate transactions involving 
26. Id. at 521. 
27. 196 u.s. 375 (1905). 
28. 262 U.S. I (1923). 
29. ld. at 35. 
30. ld. at 37. 
31. 259 u.s. 44 (1922). 
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grain futures. In Hill Taft had noted that such transactions could 
not "come within the regulatory power of Congress ... unless they 
are regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it, as directly 
interfering with interstate commerce so as to be an obstruction or a 
burden thereon."32 Taft noted with a broad wink that in enacting 
the Futures Trading Act Congress "did not have the exercise of its 
power under the commerce clause in mind,"33 and so Congress had 
left no record to which the Court could properly defer.34 Congress 
immediately took the hint, and the Grain Futures Act, "substan-
tially identical" to the invalidated Futures Trading Act except for 
its purported reliance on the interstate commerce power,3s was in-
troduced within two weeks of the Hill decision36 and enacted four 
months later. 
Cases like Lambert, Stafford and Olsen make clear that Taft 
was substantially less dedicated to a regime of limited national 
power than were more conservative figures such as McReynolds, 
Sutherland, and Butler, Justices with whom Taft is normally identi-
fied. But Taft was, in this respect, not as committed to federal 
power as Justices Holmes and Brandeis, Justices who are ordinarily 
associated with the ideals of federalism. This is made evident by 
Taft's attitude toward Hammer v. Dagenhart 37 in which the Court 
struck down a 1916 federal statute attempting to bar certain prod-
ucts of child labor from interstate commerce. Over the dissenting 
votes of Holmes, Brandeis, McKenna and Clarke, the Court, speak-
ing through Justice Day, had viewed the Act as an attempt "to reg-
ulate the hours of labor in children in factories and mines within the 
State, a purely state authority,"3s and had rested its decision on the 
principle that the "grant of power to Congress over the subject of 
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, 
and not to give it authority to control the States in their exercise of 
the police power over local trade and manufacture. "39 
Although Dagenhart appeared to rest on federalist principles 
quite contrary to those enunciated by Taft in cases like Stafford and 
32. ld. at 69. 
33. Id. at 68. 
34. On the self-conscious quality of Taft's hints, see Kutler, 51 J. Am. Hist. at 661 
(cited in note 21). 
35. Note, Two Attempts to Regulate the Grain Trade: Findings of Fact by Congress, 37 
Harv. L. Rev. 136, 138 (1923). 
36. 62 Cong. Rec. 7987 (June I, 1922) (Rep. Tincher introducing H.R. 11843, a bill 
"for the prevention and removal of obstructions and burdens upon interstate commerce in 
grain by regulating transactions on grain future exchanges"). 
37. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
38. ld. at 276. 
39. ld. at 273-74. 
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Olsen, Taft nevertheless applauded the decision.40 Indeed he had in 
1913 taken a position substantially identical to Dagenhart: 
Bills have been urged upon Congress to forbid interstate 
commerce in goods made by child labor .... The proposed law is 
to be enforced to discourage the making of articles by child labor 
in the State from which the articles were shipped. In other 
words, it seeks indirectly and by duress, to compel the States to 
pass a certain kind of legislation that is completely within their 
discretion to enact or not. Child labor in the State of the ship-
ment has no legitimate or germane relation to the interstate com-
merce of which the goods thus made are to form a part, to its 
character or to its effect. Such an attempt of Congress to use its 
power of regulating such commerce to suppress the use of child 
labor in the State of shipment would be a clear usurpation of that 
State's rights.4t 
As Chief Justice, Taft specifically reaffirmed Dagenhart in 192242 
and again in 1925.43 
There is an obvious tension between the expansive construction 
of federal power to which Taft was usually attracted, and the more 
restrictive impulses aroused in him by federal attempts to regulate 
child labor, or, more likely, manufacturing generally. When Taft 
himself sought to reconcile this tension, he argued that 
a federal law forbidding the transportation of articles manufac-
tured by child labor in one state to another was invalid, because 
it was really not a regulation of interstate commerce but a con-
gressional attempt to regulate labor in the state of origin, by an 
embargo on its external trade. Articles made by child labor and 
transported into other states were harmless, and could be prop-
erly transported without injuring any person who either bought 
or used them. In [other cases], the use of interstate commerce 
had contributed to the accomplishment of harmful results to peo-
ple of other States, and ... congressional power over interstate 
transportation in such cases could only be effectively exercised by 
prohibiting it.44 
The reasoning in this passage is impossible to square with 
Taft's own commitment to federal power, as his opinion in Brooks v. 
United States4s makes clear. In Brooks Taft authored a unanimous 
opinion sustaining the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which 
40. Kutler, 51 J. Am. Hist. at 655 (cited in note 21). 
41. Taft, Popular Government at 142-43 (cited in note 17). 
42. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922). 
43. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). 
44. ld. at 438. See Taft, Popular Government at 142-43 (cited in note 17). 
45. 267 u.s. 432 (1925). 
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prohibited the transportation of stolen cars in interstate com-
merce.46 Cars that happen to be stolen are themselves "harmless"; 
they can be "transported without injuring any person who either 
bought or used them"; and they do not effect any "harmful result to 
people" of the State into which they are driven. Congress banned 
stolen cars from interstate commerce, as Taft fully recognized, to 
deter the theft of automobiles, an undesirable form of behavior that 
was conceptually distinct from interstate commerce.47 In an ex-
actly similar manner, Congress had banned the products of child 
labor from interstate commerce to deter child labor, an undesirable 
form of behavior that was conceptually distinct from interstate 
commerce. 
Taft was unable to offer any logically cogent explanation of the 
distinction between congressional regulation of interstate commerce 
in the products of child labor and congressional regulation of inter-
state commerce in stolen automobiles. It is clear, however, that 
maintaining some form of this distinction was for him quite impor-
tant. This can be seen in Taft's unusually impassioned rhetoric in 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., a case striking down the congres-
sional Child Labor Tax, which attempted to use the taxing power to 
achieve the same results as the statute invalidated in Dagenhart: 
It is the high duty and function of this court in cases regu-
larly brought to its bar to decline to recognize or enforce seeming 
laws of Congress, dealing with subjects not intrusted to Congress 
but left or committed by the supreme law of the land to the con-
trol of the states. We can not avoid the duty even though it re-
quire us to refuse to give effect to legislation designed to promote 
the highest good. The good sought in unconstitutional legisla-
tion is an insidious feature because it leads citizens and legisla-
tors of good purpose to promote it without thought of the serious 
breach it will make in the ark of our covenant or the harm which 
will come from breaking down recognized standards. In the 
maintenance of local self-government, on the one hand, and the 
national power, on the other, our country has been able to en-
dure and prosper for near a century and a haJf.48 
46. The Act offered a strikingly broad definition of interstate commerce, as including 
"'transportation from one State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to another state, 
territory, or the District of Columbia ... .' " Id. at 436. 
47. Id. at 438-39. 
48. 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922). Taft wrote: 
The analogy of the Dagenhart Case is clear. . . . [H]ere the so-called tax is a penalty 
to coerce people of a state to act as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a 
matter completely the business of the state government under the Federal 
Constitution. 
ld. at 39. 
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If one approaches Drexel Furniture Co. solely from the perspective 
of Taft's view of congressional power-as illustrated by cases like 
Lambert or Brooks-the vehemence of this passage is deeply myste-
rious. But, strangely enough, its intensity does become explicable if 
interpreted in light of Taft's relationship to the ideal of federalism 
as cultural pluralism, an ideal most associated with the eloquent 
figure of Justice Brandeis. 
II 
It is undeniable that Brandeis stands as a major progenitor of 
modern principles of federalism. This is not because Brandeis be-
lieved in constitutional limitations on federal congressional power, 
for he, like Taft, had ample respect for the full prerogatives of that 
power.49 It is due rather to the fact that Brandeis believed that fed-
eralism required a respect for the diversity of local cultures. As 
Brandeis remarked in his important address on "True American-
ism," the unique contribution of America has been its declaration 
"for equality of nationalities as well as for equality of individuals":5o 
The movements of the last century have proved that whole 
peoples have individuality no less marked than that of the single 
person; that the individuality of a people is irrepressible, and that 
the misnamed internationalism which seeks the obliteration of 
nationalities or peoples is unattainable. The new nationalism 
adopted by America proclaims that each race or people, like each 
individual, has the right and duty to develop, and that only 
through such differentiated development will high civilization be 
attained. 51 
The federalism dearest to Brandeis was thus dedicated to preserv-
ing, to the extent consistent with a powerful national government, 
"the heterogeneity inherent in local and regional differentiation. "52 
In his words, "America has believed that in differentiation, not in 
uniformity, lies the path of progress."53 
It is fair to say that Taft was in profound disagreement with 
every aspect of this ideal of federalism. For Taft the fundamental 
end of government was not the development of groups or cultures, 
49. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Lambert v. Yel/owley, 272 
U.S. 581 (1926); Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I (1923). 
50. Louis D. Brandeis, True Americanism (July 4, 1915), in Brandeis on Zionism: A 
Collection of Addresses and Statements by Louis D. Brandeis 8 (Zionist Organization of 
America, 1942) ("Brandeis on Zionism"). 
51. ld. at 10-11. 
52. Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography. Blasphemy, and the 
First Amendment, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 302 (1988). 
53. Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism at 10 (cited in note 50). 
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but "the promotion of the happiness of the individual and his 
progress. "s4 
We believe that government is, of course, for the benefit of 
society as a whole, but that society is composed of individuals 
and that the benefit of society as a whole is only consistent with 
the full opportunity of its members to pursue happiness and their 
individual liberty. This, in the broadest and proper sense, in-
cludes freedom from personal restraint, right of free labor, right 
of property, right of religious worship, right of contract.ss 
Because Taft understood the public good to consist of the sum of 
the happiness of individuals, he deeply opposed any conception of 
politics that legitimated the interests of particular 
groups.s6"Division into groups means .... the willingness of each 
to sacrifice the general interest of the country to the achievement of 
a particular object."s7 For Taft, intermediate social structures like 
culture or class created a "group system" that defeated "responsi-
bility as to general policies and the common good."ss He therefore 
believed that the great strength of the American party structure was 
that the "two large parties" were "each made up of all classes and 
conditions. Their cleavage is vertical and not horizontal."s9 As a 
result "[t]hey can not be selfish in seeking the welfare of one group, 
because their constituent elements, if they would hold them to-
gether, forbid. Party success thus bids them to take an obviously 
patriotic course, having the interests of all in view."60 For the same 
reason he also distrusted and resented those immigrants who re-
tained "their old country relations and customs and language," 
hoping "that the present serious movement for the Americanization 
of these elements of our population will lessen the danger of their 
presence in our community."6t 
Taft's version of individualism, from the very beginning of his 
career, was founded on a naturalized, presocial image of the person. 
54. Taft, Popular Government at 9-10 (cited in note 17). William Howard Taft, Liberty 
Under Law: An Interpretation of the Principles of Our Constitutional Government 51 (Yale U. 
Press, 1922) ("Liberty Under Law"). 
55. William Howard Taft, The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court 37 (Harper & 
Brothers, 1914) ("The Anti-Trust Act"). 
56. For a discussion of the interrelationship between individualism and what I have 
elsewhere termed assimilationism and pluralism, see Post, 76 Calif. L. Rev. at 302-05, 319-24 
(cited in note 52). 
57. Taft, Liberty Under Law at 33 (cited in note 54). 
58. ld. at 34-35. 
59. William Howard Taft, Representative Government in the United States 25 (N.Y.U. 
Press, 1921) ("Representative Government"). 
60. ld. 
61. I d. at 45-46. 
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He understood human nature to be driven primarily by selfish moti-
vations.62 The trick was to channel these motivations into socially 
useful channels. This was the object and achievement of property 
rights63 which were therefore to be understood as "the keystone of 
our society. "64 
The certainty that a man could enjoy as his own that which he 
produced, furnished the strongest motive beyond what was 
merely necessary to obtain the bare necessities of life. The 
knowledge that what he saved would enable him to increase and 
share the result of another's labor was the chief inducement to 
economy and self control . . . . In other words, the institution of 
private property is what has led to the accumulation of capital in 
the world. Capital represents and measures the difference be-
tween the present condition of society and that which prevailed 
when men lived by what their hands would produce without im-
plements, or other means of increasing the result of their labor, 
that is, between the utter barbarism of prehistoric ages and mod-
em civilization.65 
Because human nature was universal, so too were property 
rights. To weaken them was to endanger "our whole social 
fabric"66 by undermining "the motive of enlightened selfishness that 
to-day is at the basis of all human labor and effort, enterprise and 
new activity."67 Infringing property rights would violate the "limi-
tations" of government "power, which are fixed ... by the inexora-
ble law of economics. "6s These laws were uniform; they did not 
vary from state to state or from region to region. "The lesson must 
be learned, expensive as it is proving to be, that there is only a lim-
62. Taft, Popular Government at 91, 231, (cited in note 17). 
63. The very advantage to be derived from the security of private property in our 
civilization is that it turns the natural selfishness and desire for gain into the strong-
est motive for doing that without which the upward development of mankind would 
cease and retrogression would begin. 
William Howard Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 Mich. L. J. 215, 224 (1894). 
64. Taft, 29 Am. L. Rev. at 654 (cited in note 18). 
65. Taft, 3 Mich. L. J. at 220-21 (cited in note 63). See Taft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty 
at 14-20 (cited in note 20). 
66. Id. at 231. 
67. Taft, Popular Government at 91 (cited in note 17). At times Taft generalized the 
point to a defense of inequality as such: 
Inequality is essential to progress. If you make a dead level there will be no interest 
in life or motive for effort, and you will destroy the very spring of progress and the 
fountain of Christian civilization. 
William Howard Taft, Ethics in Service 87-88 (Kennikat Press, 1969). 
68. Taft, 3 Mich. L. J. at 229 (cited in note 63). See Taft, Popular Government at 230 
(cited in note 17). Taft often acknowledged his intellectual debt to "the influence of the 
laissez fa ire school of political and economic thought which was largely in control when I was 
in college. Professor Sumner was a strong member of this school." Taft, Ethics in Service at 
91 (cited in note 67). See Taft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty at 8-15 (cited in note 20). 
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ited zone within which legislation and governments can accomplish 
good. We cannot regulate beyond that zone with success or bene-
fit .... If we do not conform to human nature in legislation we shall 
fail. "69 
The zone of possible legislation was defined and enforced by a 
national regime of constitutional rights in property: 
Our Constitution has been called too individualistic. It rests 
on personal liberty and the right of property. In the last analysis, 
personal liberty includes the right of property as it includes the 
right of contract and the right of labor. Our primary conception 
of a free man is one who can enjoy what he earns, who can spend 
it for his comfort or pleasure if he would, who can save it and 
keep it for his future use and benefit if he has the foresight and 
self-restraint to do so. This is the right of property. Upon this 
right rests the motive of the individual which makes the world 
materially to progress. Destroy it and material progress ceases. 
Until human nature becomes far more exalted in moral character 
and self-sacrifice than it is today, the motive of gain is the only 
one which will be constant to induce industry, saving, invention 
and organization, which will effect an increase in production 
greater than the increase in population. 70 
Hence even though citizens of the different states, responsive to 
their differing cultures, desired to enact legislation to achieve a 
"wider equality of comfort and living" and "economic as distin-
guished from ... political reform," in fact "[n]either Congress nor a 
state legislature has it within its power to work such economic 
changes, even though they were possible."11 For Taft this lack of 
power was true in the double and complementary sense of economic 
necessity and constitutional prohibition. 
The great task of the judiciary was the enforcement of constitu-
tional protection for individual rights, upon which the maintenance 
of modern civilization depended. n The "very purpose" of the Con-
stitution was to offer protection for "the fundamental rights of the 
individual. "73 Taft thus viewed the power of judicial review as "the 
secret of the strength of our nation"; to weaken that power would 
69. Taft, Liberty Under Law at 42 (cited in note 54). 
70. ld. at 25-26. 
71. Taft, Representative Government at II (cited in note 59). Taft took a very strong 
incorporationist position. He understood the fourteenth amendment to vest "in the National 
Government the power and duty to protect, against the aggression of a State, every person 
within the jurisdiction of the United States in most of the personal rights, violation of which 
by Congress is forbidden in the first eight amendments to the Constitution." Taft, Popular 
Government at 128 (cited in note 17). 
72. Taft, Popular Government at 180-81 (cited in note 17). 
73. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921). 
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necessarily lead "to socialism."74 For this reason the "greatest ad-
vantage of our plan of government over every other is the character 
of the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court. "1s "[T]here has 
been nothing in our form of government so admirable and useful in 
its workings as the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
authority which it has exercised, ... in the security it has given to 
life, liberty, and property. "76 
In this way, Taft's image of a universal, pre-social human na-
ture led inexorably toward a vision of national rights. This vision 
was fundamentally incompatible with any notion of federalism 
founded upon a respect for regional or cultural heterogeneity. In 
fact for Taft the chief advantage of federal law was precisely its 
uniformity, its ability to facilitate civilized growth evenly through-
out the nation: 
Another test of the trained self-restraint of the American 
people is the constitutional and statutory provisions enabling 
non-residents to avoid the assumed local prejudice of state courts 
against them by trying their controversies with home people in 
Federal Courts .... It is not too much to say, however, that few 
factors in the rapid growth of the newer parts of the country 
have been more effective than the knowledge by those whose con-
fidence and capital were needed to build up that new country 
that the Constitution and the laws of the nation furnished a na-
tional court wholly impartial between citizens of all the states in 
which the contracts and property rights, though they were non-
residents, could be adjudged and protected. Such courts have in 
an indirect but most strikingly effective way united the sections 
of the country in a common effort to develop our great 
resources. 77 
Taft worked diligently, along many different fronts, to promote 
that uniformity. He vigorously defended diversity jurisdiction, ar-
guing that "no single element in our governmental system has done 
so much to secure capital for the legitimate development of enter-
prises throughout the West and South as the existence of federal 
courts there, with a jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases. "7s 
74. Taft, Popular Government at 180-82 (cited in note 17). Taft, Ethics in Service at 96 
(cited in note 67). 
75. Taft, Popular Government at 184 (cited in note 17). 
76. Taft, The Anti-Trust Act at 41 (cited in note 55). 
77. William Howard Taft, At the Cradle of Its Greatness, 8 A.B.A. J. 333, 335 (1922). 
Taft had made this same point as early as 1895. Taft, 29 Am. L. Rev. at 658-59 (cited in note 
18). See Tony A. Freyer, The Federal Courts. Localism. and the National Economy, 1865-
1900, 53 Business History Rev. 343, 344-46 (1979). 
78. William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in 
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 (1922). For a description of Chief Justice Taft's lobby-
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He defended the right of foreign corporations to be free from state 
regulations impeding access to federal courts. 79 He upheld the doc-
trine of Swift v. Tyson,so which authorized the application of a uni-
form federal "common law" in diversity cases.s1 He supported a 
strong preemption doctrine.s2 He was concerned to protect inter-
state commerce from the intrusions of state regulation.s3 And, 
most importantly, he stood staunchly by the substantive protection 
for property that he viewed as required by the Due Process Clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. With the exception of his notable 
dissent in Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Colum-
bia,s4 Taft solidly supported the tendency of his Court to resist reg-
ulation of property rights. In the great proportion of controversial 
cases decided during his tenure, his vote was to protect property 
against state regulation.ss 
Needless to say, federalism as an ideal of cultural pluralism 
had no place whatever in this program; Taft sought instead to estab-
lish an implacable and naturally grounded universality. 
III 
This uniform regime of constitutional rights, in tum, requires 
us to reevaluate Taft's support of Dagenhart. It makes clear the 
inadequacy of conceptualizing that support as a simple limitation 
on federal power, since in Taft's mind the fourteenth amendment's 
federalized protection of property rights would continue to govern, 
whether or not Congress was empowered to act. Decentralization 
was therefore sharply circumscribed by a ring of national rights.s6 
ing efforts against Senator Norris's campaign to strip federal courts of their diversity jurisdic-
tion, see Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice at 127-28 (cited in note 3). 
79. See Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922). 
80. 41 U.S. I (1842). 
81. See Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928); Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie 
Cases in American Federalism !04-09, 159 (N.Y.U. Press, 1981). 
82. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926); 
First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
83. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921); Dahnke- Walker Mill. Co. v. 
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Shafer v. 
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Public 
Utilities Comm. of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
84. 261 U.S. 525, 562-67 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
85. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Prudential Insurance Co. v. 
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) (Taft, C.J., dissenting); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway 
Co. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922) (Taft, C.J., dissenting); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); 
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 
(1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
86. Thus Thomas Reed Powell was moved to this summary of the work of the Taft 
Court: "For one interested in local self government the work of the Supreme Court of the 
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But this does not explain why Taft in Dagenhart sought affirm-
atively to limit federal power. Why, we may ask, was decentraliza-
tion, however limited, to be constitutionally mandated at all? Why 
did Taft not join Brandeis and Holmes and abandon all pretense of 
a rigorous distinction between "local self-government, on the one 
hand, and the national power, on the other"?s7 Why did Taft, in 
Drexel Furniture Co., so passionately locate this distinction within 
the very "ark of our covenant"?ss 
When Taft was evicted from the Presidency in 1912, he chose 
to return to Yale as a Law Professor. He put together a series of 
lectures on the conditions of contemporary government, which were 
later collected and published as his book on Popular Government: 
Its Essence, Its Permanence and Its Perils. The closest Taft ever 
came to systematically addressing the question of federalism was in 
Chapter VI of that book. 
In Chapter VI Taft remarked upon the vast increase of federal 
power. "This great expansion of Federal activities has been almost 
within the present generation and within the recollection, and by 
the agency, of living men. "s9 This expansion "has not come from a 
new construction of the Constitution, but it has come from the fact 
that the Federal power has been enlarged by the expansion of the 
always conceded subjects of national activities."90 A "tendency to-
ward greater paternalism" has caused "Congress to vest, by statute, 
in the general Government, powers that under the Constitution 
were impliedly within congressional creation, but which had been 
allowed to lie dormant in view of the supposed lack of public neces-
sity for their exercise."9t This growth of federal power, however, 
"has not changed the form of our government, nor has it lessened 
our obligation to respect the sovereign rights of the State[s]."92 To 
the contrary, Taft wished to stress "the importance of maintaining 
the constitutional autonomy of our States."93 
Taft offered two reasons for this position. The first concerned 
the need for decentralized management. 
Our Federal system is the only form of popular government that 
United States in applying the Fourteenth Amendment to state legislation must raise the ques-
tion whether judicial centralization is not pushed to an extreme under our federal system.·· 
Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-30, 17 Va. L. Rev. 
529, 531 (1931). 
87. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922). 
88. ld. 
89. Taft, Popular Government at 144 (cited in note 17). 
90. ld. at 138. 
91. ld. at 140. 
92. ld. at 144. 
93. ld. at 144-45. 
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would be possible in a country like ours, with an enormous terri-
tory and 100,000,000 population. There is a great homogeneity 
among the people, greater indeed than many of us suppose, but, 
on the other hand, not only the mere geographical differences, 
but the differing interests of the people in different localities, re-
quire that a certain part of their government should be clearly 
within their own local control and not subject to the interference 
of people living at a great distance from them. 94 
215 
The varying circumstances and interests of the different regions of 
the nation, Taft argued, precluded effective governance from Wash-
ington D.C., the point from which, as he ironically put it, "every-
thing radiates to the ends of the country."9s Only a decentralized 
government could be responsive to local needs and conditions.96 
But this responsiveness was to be safely confined, because the uni-
form floor of the fourteenth amendment would ensure that local 
governance could never trench on aspects of the national culture 
that Taft deemed essential. 
The concept of federalism as decentralized management is pri-
marily a practical one. It turns on pragmatic questions of adminis-
trability. It holds that a certain degree of localism is necessary and 
useful for the successful prosecution of government business. The 
image is of a purely tactical division of power. As issues become 
"so national in their character and effect that people remote from 
them geographically are ... affected,"97 so too will the allocation of 
power ascend from local to federal levels. 
This practical, common-sense perspective represents an impor-
tant strand in Taft's jurisprudential thinking. His discussion of the 
constitutional limits of national power not infrequently veers to-
ward issues of managerial strategy and tactics.9s In fact Taft's in-
terpretation of the fourteenth amendment was also, by his own 
lights, heavily influenced by such considerations. He was fully 
aware that because of the increased "mutual dependence" charac-
teristic of advanced industrial society, property rights ought to in-
terpreted in a manner "appreciative of the change of conditions and 
the necessity for a liberal construction of the restrictions of the Con-
94. Id. at 145. 
95. Taft, Presidential Addresses at 549 (cited in note 18). 
96. Thus Taft wrote to his brother Horace on November 10, 1924, that he was "glad" 
that Massachusetts had defeated the child labor amendment, "because I don't think the Con-
stitution ought to be amended to take away the powers of the States. I think child labor is a 
matter for local administration, and that the requirements differ in different States." Letter 
from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Nov. 10, 1924) (Taft Papers, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 268). 
97. Taft, Popular Government at 148-49 (cited in note 17). 
98. ld. at 145-51; Taft, Presidential Addresses at 549-54 (cited in note 18). 
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stitution."99 He even wrote in 1914 that Lochner v. New York was 
no longer good law.too This is the strain in Taft's jurisprudence that 
led him, for example, to dissent in Adkins and to uphold statutory 
regulation of hail insurance in light of the peculiar local characteris-
tics of the business.101 It is important to stress, however, that Taft's 
instinct to respond pragmatically to practical problems was always 
checked by his concern not to permit government to trench on 
those rights necessitated by the universal requirements of human 
nature.1o2 
If pressed, Taft's explanation of federalism as embodying the 
strategic value of decentralized management would require a fluid 
division of federal and state power, of the kind exemplified by Car-
dozo's dissent in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,w3 or by Chief Justice 
Hughes's opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 104 Con-
gressional power over intrastate activities would be authorized "if 
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions .... The question is nec-
essarily one of degree."ws We can only speculate as to whether 
99. Taft, The Anti-Trust Act at 44-47 (cited in note 55). See William Howard Taft, The 
Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 Ky. L. 1. 3, 8-11 (Nov. 1916). 
100. Taft, The Anti-Trust Act at 45 (cited in note 55). In his dissent in Adkins Taft had 
justified his disregard of Lochner on the ground that it had been overruled "sub silentio" by 
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 563-64 
(1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). In point of fact, however, Taft had publicly disavowed Loch-
ner at least three years before Bunting. 
101. National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922). See also 
Merchants Mutual Automobile Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925). 
102. Note, for example, the movement of the rhetoric in this passage from Taft, Liberty 
Under Law at 39-43 (cited in note 54): 
Social groups in a great community become more interdependent. . . . Our 
constitutional system has been easily elastic in these regards, and courts have not 
failed to apply it to conform to the needs of the community. These changing condi-
tions have led some reformers to condemn what they call the excessive individual-
ism of the Constitution. I confess I do not follow them. The rights of personal 
liberty and of property as protected by the courts are not obstructive to any reason-
able qualification of these rights in the interest of the community. Indeed, we may 
well question whether the paternalistic enthusiasm of such reformers has not gone 
too far. The strength of the American in the past has been in his independence and 
self-reliance. 
• •• 
We must stop attempting to reform people by wholesale. It is the individual 
upon whom our whole future progress depends. In giving and securing scope for 
his ambition, energy, and free action our constitutional system has its chief merit, 
whatever would-be reformers say. 
103. 298 U.S. 238, 326-30 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("The underlying thought is 
merely this, that 'the law is not indifferent to considerations of degree.' "). 
104. 301 U.S. I (1937). 
105. Id. at 37. In reaching this conclusion, Hughes quoted and relied heavily upon lan-
guage from Taft's opinions in Olsen and Stafford v. Wallace: 
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or 
1992] TAFT AND FEDERALISM 217 
Taft would have remained true to this perspective if faced with the 
disaster of the Great Depression, which revealed to all but the most 
doctrinaire the very real interdependence of all economic activities 
in the nation. 
What is clear, however, is that this essentially administrative 
account of federalism cannot begin to account for the passionate 
rhetoric of Drexel Furniture. To locate the source of that powerful 
commitment to "the ark of our covenant,"t06 we must turn to the 
second justification for federalism offered by Taft in Popular 
Government. 
IV 
After discussing for several pages the practical arrangements 
necessary for the States to retain "their dignity and power" 101 Taft 
suddenly switched gears and escalated the intensity of his rhetoric. 
It was "essential," he argued, "that the power and functions of the 
State governments be maintained in all the fulness that they were 
intended to have by the framers of the Constitution," because: 
A school has arisen called the New Nationalist School that 
proposes to put into operation a great many new remedies 
through the National Government, basing the national authority 
on the failure or unfitness of the States to discharge their proper 
and exclusive duties under the Constitution. This school is one 
which is closely associated with that which is trying to enforce 
new doctrines as to the direct rule of the people and an unsettling 
of the security of individual rights. Its members are generally 
impatient with the suggestion that certain reforms can only be 
effected through the State governments. They are in favor of na-
tional "hair trigger" legislation, and anything that has to depend 
upon the action of the forty-eight different States can never be of 
that kind. 
To one opposed to the adoption of such remedies as I have 
unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory 
power of Congress under the commerce clause and it is primarily for Congress to 
consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. 
106. Taft's use of the phrase "ark of the covenant" is particularly telling in light of its 
long history as an object of ridicule by those opposed to activist forms of conservative judicial 
review. Thomas Jefferson, for example, had in 1816 ridiculed those who "look at constitu-
tions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred 
to be touched." Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in Adrienne Koch and William 
Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 674 (Modem Library, 1944). 
As recently as 1913 Yale professor and progressive candidate for Congress Yandell Hender-
son had spoken with disdain of conservatives who believed that "The Constitution was the 
Ark of the Covenant especially entrusted to the judiciary for protection." Yandell Hender-
son, The Progressive Movement and Constitutional Reform, Yale Rev. 79 (Oct. 1913). 
107. Taft, Popular Government at 151 (cited in note 17). 
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been commenting on, the existence of the State governments is 
one of the chief grounds for hope that the tendency to error in 
the weakening of constitutional guaranties that is now going on 
in some States may be halted by the conservatism of other States, 
and that the errors from actual experience in departing from rep-
resentative government in the more radical States will ultimately 
bring back the whole nation to sounder views. 10s 
The passage is remarkable, for it at last joins the dry topic of 
federalism to the nerve center of Taft's jurisprudence. Theodore 
Roosevelt's famous 1910 address at Osawatomie, Kansas, entitled 
"The New Nationalism," had forcefully and directly challenged 
Taft's vision of judicially protected property rights. "[E]very man 
holds his property," Roosevelt had argued, "subject to the general 
right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the 
public welfare many require it."I09 Roosevelt urged reform at ana-
tional level, seeking to inspire "a spirit of broad and far-reaching 
nationalism" that would engender a "judiciary that . . . shall be 
interested primarily in human welfare rather than in property."1 10 
For Taft this was no less than a threat to the "whole fate of consti-
tutional government."l 11 If the "New Nationalism" could capture 
the federal government, it would be able to undo at one "hair-trig-
ger" stroke the system of self-restraint that guaranteed the contin-
ued existence of property rights. By religiously enforcing the 
division of power between state and federal governments, however, 
the social impulses represented by the New Nationalism would be 
forced to exhaust themselves in the conduct of an arduous state-by-
state campaign. 
Principles of federalism, in other words, were important be-
cause they diffused power between the States and the national gov-
ernment. This diffusion functioned "to defend us all against the 
danger of sudden gusts of popular passion and to secure for us the 
delay and deliberation in political changes essential to secure con-
sidered action by the people."1 12 Because the people were driven by 
a primitive "demand for equality of condition,"1 13 they were all too 
likely to forget that it "is the individual upon whom our whole fu-
ture progress depends. In giving and securing scope for his ambi-
108. ld. at 151-53. 
109. Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, in Social Justice and Popular Rule, 19 
The Works of Theodore Roosevelt 24 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925). 
110. I d. at 26-27. 
Ill. Taft to J.G. Schurman, Feb. 29, 1912, quoted in Pringle, 2 The Life and Times of 
William Howard Taft at 757 (cited in note 19). For accounts of Taft's horror at the New 
Nationalism, see id. at 572-74, 757-58, 781, 822, 832-33, 840-41. 
112. Taft, Liberty Under Law at 19-20 (cited in note 54). 
113. Taft, Representative Government at 10-11 (cited in note 59). 
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tion, energy, and free action our constitutional system has its chief 
merit, whatever would-be reformers say."114 Thus any "reasonable 
suspension of popular action until calm public consideration of reli-
able evidence can be secured is in the interest of a wise decision. 
That at least was what our forefathers thought in making our Fed-
eral Government and the result has vindicated them." 11s 
Taft was fond of using the example of Kansas populism to 
make his point: 
The experience of Kansas and some of the other States, 
where populism ran riot for a time, is instructive. Then everyone 
was against the creditor and in favor of the debtor and wished to 
put obstacles in the path of the former in seeking to recover his 
money when due. To gratify the popular demand, the legislature 
passed stay laws which introduce many delays in the legal proce-
dure of the State for the collection of mortgages. The people of 
Kansas learned a lesson from the result of such legislation that 
has not yet been forgotten. Capital fled the State of Kansas as 
men flee from a contagious disease and business became as dead 
in Kansas as if it had no population at all. The blight that fol-
lowed taught the statesmen of that State the utilitarian doctrine 
that honesty is the best policy, and that laws that drove creditors 
from a State and frightened away all capital, helped neither those 
who owed money nor those who did not owe money in the State. 
These so-called remedial laws were very soon repealed and since 
then other States have not made exactly the same mistake, 
though there are similar lessons in store for many of them. 
There is a great advantage in having different State govern-
ments try different experiments in the enactment of laws and in 
governmental policies, so that a State less prone to accept novel 
and untried remedies may await their development by States 
more enterprising and more courageous. The end is that the di-
versity of opinion in State governments enforces a wise delibera-
tion and creates a locus poenitentiae which may constitute the 
salvation of the Republic.116 
Reserving significant areas of regulation to the "exclusive" jurisdic-
tion of the States was thus a method to force the nation to observe 
the results of constitutionally mandated state "experiments." In 
this manner the desire of "the 'hair trigger' reformer . . . to reform 
the entire country at one [sic]"117 would be frustrated, and "a wise 
deliberation" would be enforced by creating time for the entire 
114. Taft, Liberty Under Law at 43 (cited in note 54). 
115. ld. at 21-22. 
116. Taft, Popular Government at 154-55 (cited in note 17). See Taft, Ethics in Service at 
89-90 (cited in note 67). 
117. Taft, Popular Government at 151 (cited in note 17). 
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country to witness what for Taft would be the inevitably negative 
effects of the contemporary "disease of excessive legislation."IIs 
Federalism therefore served as part of that larger system of self-
restraint which was the glory of the Constitution. 
This account of federalism, however, is structural rather than 
substantive. It focuses on the systemic need to defuse power, and so 
offers no particular guidance as to which areas of legislation ought 
to be reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the States. For Taft 
this guidance came primarily from his vision of human nature and 
the concomitant need to preserve rights in property. Such rights 
were most especially in need of protection from the gusts of popular 
passion. 
This perception underlay Taft's distinction between congres-
sional competence to regulate interstate commerce in stolen cars, 
and congressional incompetence to regulate interstate commerce in 
the products of child labor. The latter trenched on property rights; 
the former did not. Even if States were ultimately empowered 
under the fourteenth amendment to regulate the conditions of child 
labor, it was nevertheless an area in which caution and deliberation 
ought to be required, and hence in which the structural principle of 
federalism ought to be brought into play. 
Of course in engaging that principle Taft was careful to distin-
guish between ordinary property and property that fell into the nar-
row category of having been "affected with a public interest. "119 
With respect to ordinary property, "freedom" was "the general 
rule, and restraint the exception. The legislative authority to 
abridge can be justified only by exceptional circumstances." 120 The 
rule was quite otherwise, however, for property affected with a pub-
lic interest, which was broadly subject to reasonable regulation, 
even to the extent of "fixing wages and terms of employment."I2I It 
is no accident, therefore, that the very cases in which Taft strongly 
endorsed the national commerce power all involved forms of prop-
erty that were affected with the public interest.I22 Such property 
did not require special protection. But Dagenhart and Drexel Fur-
niture Co. involved the regulation of ordinary property, and in such 
118. Taft, Liberty Under Law at 41 (cited in note 54). 
119. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). 
120. ld. at 534. 
121. ld. at 535. 
122. On railroads, see id., Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 
456, 481 (1924); Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Georgia Pub/. Ser. Comm., 267 U.S. 493, 496-
97 (1925). On stockyards, see Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922). On grain mar-
kets, see Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I, 40-41 (1923). 
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circumstances Taft was determined to invoke the structural limita-
tions of federalism. 
The irony, of course, is that Taft thus understood federalism as 
ultimately grounded in a quest for ways of ensuring the mainte-
nance of a national regime of individual rights, one which would 
provide a uniform floor beneath which states could not sink in their 
regulation of property. In the end this is what distinguished Taft's 
perspective on federalism from that of Brandeis, who, like Taft, also 
invoked the metaphor of "experimentation": 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experi-
ment .... But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever 
on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If 
we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be 
bold.t23 
For Taft experimentation would forestall change, create the time 
for deliberation, and ultimately reveal the folly of crossing the uni-
versal and inexorable laws of human nature. For Brandeis, on the 
other hand, experimentation would open the possibility of genuinely 
new social arrangements. For Taft experimentation would be 
sharply circumscribed by a national regime of property and individ-
ual rights; the "Constitution was intended-its very purpose was-
to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual."t24 For Brandeis, on the other hand, experimentation 
would mean liberation from preconceived "prejudices" and timid 
conceptions of human nature and property. 
For Taft, in short, federalism was simply a device to further 
strengthen individualistic rights that themselves sharply limited the 
autonomy of state governments. This is a vision of federalism that 
Taft paradoxically shares with another great proponent of individu-
alist rights, Justice William J. Brennan, who also viewed federalism 
as "a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens."12s 
123. New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
124. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921). 
125. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 503 (1977). Brennan argues that "state experimentation" which "en-
dangers the continued existence of our national rights and liberties" is "antithetical to the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights 
and the Stares: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
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The difference between the two, a difference scored by the gulf of 
the Great Depression, lies in the conception of the person. But that 
is another story. If we focus instead narrowly on the structure of 
federalism, Taft stands as an eerie precursor of the last great repre-
sentative of the individualistic nationalism of the Warren Court. 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 550 (1986). For a full discussion, see Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan 
and Federalism, 7 Const. Comm. 227 (1990). Brennan, of course, did not understand princi-
ples of federalism to require the limitation of national power, excep~ to t_he extent tha~ th_e 
"adequate state ground" doctrine may be understood to reflect a qualtficatlon of federal JUdi-
cial power. 
